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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to elucidate whether supply side factors played a crucial role in causing the 
“reluctance to lend” in Japan in the 1990s. We estimate loan supply and demand functions using 
prefectural panel data and calculate their shifts. Our analysis reveals that the demand side 
played an equal or greater role, even in the context of the historical financial crisis in Japan 
during the period 1997–2000, and that the reluctance to lend was severer in the urban 
prefectures. These findings suggest that countermeasures in the banking sector that uniformly 
influence all regions may not achieve the expected recovery.  
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1.  Introduction 
 Since 2007, subprime loan problems have hit financial institutions worldwide. Many 
of these institutions have reported huge losses and financial troubles. Among them, in the 
United States, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, Bear Sterns was sold 
to JP Morgan Chase in March 2008 owing to pressure from the Federal Reserve Bank, and there 
was a run on Indy Mac in July 2008. The possibility of a credit crunch has been discussed since 
the summer of 2007 (e.g., The Japan Times, Oct. 13, 2007). Indeed, bank credit and loans and 
leases in bank credit in the US, which had been increasing almost monotonically for years, 
started decreasing in April 2008 (see Figure 1). The purpose of this paper is to identify what can 
be learned from the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s.  
 The Japanese loan market was in a severe slump from 1990 to 2003, which is 
considered a significant historical event. This period of financial crisis might gain new 
significance, however, if lessons can be gleaned from it. Figure 2 shows the level of bank credit 
in Japan and the US. The solid line in the figure represents the amount of loans advanced by 
domestically licensed banks in Japan since 1944. The path of this line indicates that the 1990s 
was the first decade in postwar Japan to experience a significant decline in the amount of loans 
being advanced. A closer inspection of Figure 2 reveals that lending growth actually became 
sluggish around 1993 but still continued to increase until around 1998. Then the amount of 
loans began to decrease until 2004; however, the graph shows a recovery after 2005. The dotted 
line in Figure 2 represents the bank credit of commercial banks in the US since 1973, which 
shows a monotonic upward trend. However, as shown in Figure 1, this trend became stagnant 
after April 2008, suggesting that the United States has been facing a sharp decline in outstanding 
loans since July 2008. Thus, it is important for us to ask what we can learn from the nightmarish 
events of financial distress in Japan in the 1990s, and how can this knowledge benefit the 
current lending issues in the US. 
 When Japan faced this remarkable stagnancy of loans in the 1990s, it was said that 
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firms, especially small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) were in trouble because their 
applications for loans had been refused by banks. The general opinion, including that of the Diet, 
the government, and the media, was that the banks were to blame and that the problem stemmed 
from the banks’ reluctance to advance loans.  
 Some economists attribute the Japanese depression of the 1990s to the fall in stock 
prices, which decreased bank assets and, in turn, impaired their capital. Therefore, banks were 
compelled to compress loans in order to clear regulations by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). A fall in land prices may have been another cause: it decreased the values of 
collateral and banks suffered losses due to the bankruptcy of their borrowers. Thus, Japan fell 
into a vicious circle: an increase in the bankruptcy of borrowers together with a fall in land 
prices led to a rise in nonperforming loans, which caused the banks to reduce lending to firms 
(i.e., it led to a credit crunch). Conversely, the credit crunch reduced borrower options and thus 
contributed toward an increase in the number of bankruptcies, thereby worsening the Japanese 
economy. In order to end this vicious circle, the Japanese government injected a huge amount of 
public funds into banks in 1998 and in 1999. 
 However, it is important to recognize that the problem is not that simple. Because the 
Japanese economy was in a serious slump and the loan interest rate was falling throughout the 
1990s, the decrease in the amount of loans may have come from the demand side, and not from 
the supply side.1 If this was the case, it would have been necessary to increase the demand for 
loans by raising firms’ effective demand to revitalize the slumped Japanese economy. A measure 
to support banks, such as injection of public funds, could only have a limited effect on raising 
the loan amount.2
 This paper aims to elucidate which side, supply or demand, caused a decrease in loans 
in Japan in the 1990s, with a special focus on its spatial differences. As explained in the next 
  
                                                   
1 Declining loan interest rate is derived only from a left shift in the demand function or a right shift 
in the supply function. 
2 Still, it helps banks to amortize their bad loans and to escape from their failures. 
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section, many of the previous studies on the credit crunch in Japan have focused on the effects 
of banks’ own capital ratios and nonperforming loans on the supply of loans. The analysis in 
these studies identifies how the supply side is affected by these factors, but they exclusively 
consider the supply side; it may still be true that raising the demand for loans is the key to 
recovery. This paper is unique in that it estimates both the loan supply and demand functions 
and calculates their shifts to reveal which side and which factors primarily caused the decrease 
in loans. In addition, using a prefectural panel data set, this paper tries to clarify whether the 
credit crunch—or “reluctance to lend”—hit the Japanese economy uniformly or whether it 
affected only specific regions. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we survey the 
literature. In section 3, we explain the analytical framework, specification of our model, 
estimation method, and data. In section 4, we present and discuss the results. Section 5 
concludes the article. 
 
2.  An overview of the literature 
 There have been many studies on the credit crunch or reluctance to lend in Japan. 
Most of them focus on bank behavior (i.e., the supply side of loans). These studies have tried to 
explain the stagnant loan market of the 1990s by focusing mostly on the fall in land prices, the 
rise in bad loans, and the regulation of banks’ own capital ratios. 
 Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) found that nonperforming loans had a negative effect on 
loan supply in the 1990s and banks’ own capital ratios had a positive effect. In other words, their 
study supports the existence of the credit crunch. Conversely, Yoshikawa et al. (1994) found that 
there was no significant negative correlation between nonperforming loan ratios and loan supply 
in the early 1990s; therefore, they denied the occurrence of the credit crunch during that period. 
 In many other studies, the results are mixed. For example, Woo (1999) conducted a 
cross-sectional analysis using bank financial data from 1991 to 1997 in order to clarify the 
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effect of bank’s own capital ratios on loans, and reported that they had significant effects in 
1997, but not in the other periods. Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) analyzed the fall in 
corporate investment in the 1990s and found that it was largely explained by real factors in 
1992–1994, but it was triggered by financial factors in 1997. Horie (2001), Ishikawa (2005), 
and Watanabe (2007) obtained similar results. These studies suggest that the credit crunch was 
severe in the late 1990s, but not in the early 1990s. Ito and Sasaki (2002) tested whether 
increase in bank capital, which was financed by subordinate debentures, affected the loan supply. 
They found that banks’ own capital ratios had positive effects on loan supply in larger banks but 
not in smaller banks. Honda et al. (1995) obtained similar results. These studies also suggest 
that the credit crunch was severer in larger banks than in smaller banks.  
 Some studies focused on banks’ excessive forbearance: banks advanced additional 
loans to sluggish industries, such as construction and real estate, in order to postpone their 
failures. Peek and Rosengren (2005) confirmed empirically that the banks practiced forbearance 
lending, particularly if a bank had a reported capital ratio close to its required capital ratio and 
particularly to affiliated borrowers. Caballero et al. (2008) identified zombie firms—insolvent 
borrowers surviving on forbearance lending by banks—and found that zombie-dominated 
industries exhibited more depressed job creation and lower productivity. The works of Sasaki 
(1998) and Tsuru (2001) are in line with this study. 
 
3.  Analytical Framework  
3.1  Basic idea of the analysis 
 As evident in section 2, most of the previous studies on the Japanese loan market 
focused on the effects of BIS regulations and nonperforming loans on the supply of loans. 
However, this single estimation of the supply function may suffer from simultaneous biases. In 
order to identify the supply side function, it is necessary to take into account the demand side, 
which is carefully considered in this paper. 
 5 
  Of course, some studies have tried to control the demand side of loans in a variety of 
ways. For example, Berger and Udell (1994) adopted a reduced-form approach by adding 
demand-side variables, such as proxies for economic activities, into the reduced form equation. 
Peek and Rosengren (1995) controlled for the demand side in a study on credit supply in New 
England. However, it is still the case that such controls are not perfect and usually do not 
adequately isolate the supply shocks from the demand shocks. Therefore, our approach of 
estimating both the loan supply and the demand functions is unique and may be superior to 
other widespread approaches. 
 Another problem that has seldom been addressed in previous studies is how to define 
credit crunch. Bernanke and Lown (1991) defined credit crunch as a shift in the supply function 
due to some exogenous shock, and most of the previous studies adhere to this definition.3
 In most cases, the cause of a reduction in the size of credit may be shrinkage in the 
demand for credit as well as shrinkage in the supply. In that regard, it is important to understand 
the extent to which the supply side is responsible. Even if previous studies found a negative 
effect of BIS regulations on loans, they at best confirmed a necessary condition for the situation 
where the supply side is the main cause. It appeals to our intuition to call “credit crunch” the 
case where supply side factors are the main cause for shrinkage in loans. Thus, we intend to 
investigate whether the supply side is the dominant cause for a decrease in loans or whether it is 
 
However, this definition does not seem perfect—as argued below, it sometimes misclassifies 
counterintuitive cases as cases of credit crunch. One of the aims of this paper is to propose a 
new measure for credit crunch, or “reluctance to lend” (“Kashishibui” in Japanese), to address 
this issue. 
                                                   
3 An alternative definition of credit crunch is a phenomenon that results from banks refusing loan 
applications by firms, that is, credit rationing. As for the equilibrium credit rationing, although much 
has been written in the field of banking theory—for example, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981)—a method to estimate its magnitude has not been adequately developed. In 
addition, a change in magnitude of the equilibrium credit rationing should be associated with a shift 
in supply and demand loan functions. Moreover, according to Fair and Jaffee (1972), the magnitude 
of the disequilibrium credit rationing is relatively small after the 1990s, as noted in footnote 5. 
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the demand side. This can be quantified by the difference between shifts in the supply and 
demand functions.  
 It is possible to interpret our measure based on the attitude of banks towards advancing 
loans. When the loan supply function shifts to the left more than the loan demand function, 
borrowers face banks that have a stricter attitude towards advancing loans, and vice versa. To 
understand this, suppose that a bank’s supply schedule shrinks slightly and the demand for loans 
declines simultaneously, largely owing to an exogenous shock. In this case, a large excess 
supply emerges until the interest rate is adjusted, which implies that the lender cannot find a 
borrower unless they soften their lending attitude. At the equilibrium, the interest rate falls (i.e., 
banks offer more generous conditions to find a borrower). In this case, according to the 
conventional definition, a credit crunch is said to have occurred. In contrast, by our measure, 
there has been no occurrence of credit crunch. 
 Despite the merit of our measure, we do not use the term “credit crunch” from this 
point onward to avoid unnecessary confusion with the conventional definition of credit crunch. 
Instead, we use the term “reluctance to lend” for our concept, to indicate that we measure a 
different concept.4
 In this paper, we estimate the loan supply and demand functions assuming that the 
loan market is in equilibrium. The assumption of equilibrium seems reasonable owing to the 
fact that several studies suggest that the Japanese loan market became increasingly competitive 
after 1973.
 
5
 
 
3.2  Hypothesis of the segmented loan markets by prefecture  
 In this paper, we utilize prefectural panel data from 1990 to 2001. We use a prefectural 
                                                   
4 The English term “credit crunch” is indicated by the word Kashisiburi in Japanese, which literally 
means “reluctance to lend.” 
5 Tsutsui (1982) reports that the excess demand for loans became smaller after 1973. Takenaka 
(1983) reports that the speed of adjustment became increasingly faster. Tsutsui (2005) reports that 
the largest excess demand (supply) was about 5% (2%) of outstanding loans in the 1990s, while it 
was about 15% (5%) before 1977. 
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data set because we understand the loan markets in Japan to be segmented by prefecture: the 
amount of loans and the loan interest rate within a prefecture are determined by the demand and 
the supply of loans in the prefecture.  
 This assumption may be supported because regional banks, shinkin banks (cooperative 
banks), and credit cooperatives operate in restricted areas. Of course, this segmentation, if it 
exists, is not perfect. First, city banks have nationwide branch networks, so they engage in 
arbitrage between the prefectural loan markets. Second, regional banks have 19% of their 
branches outside the home prefecture, so “prefectural loan markets” actually overlap. Using 
cross-sectional data from 1996, Kano and Tsutsui (2003) demonstrate that the loan markets of 
shinkin banks were segmented by prefectures, while those of regional banks were not. However, 
this time, we may obtain different results because we use the panel data set from 1990 to 2001. 
In this paper, we estimate the loan supply and demand functions assuming that the loan markets 
are segmented by prefecture. If this assumption is not valid, the estimates of these functions 
would be unreasonable. However, if the estimated coefficients of loan interest rate and other 
prefecture-specific variables show the expected signs, the assumption of market segmentation is 
validated. 
 
3.3  Specification of the loan supply function 
 We derive a loan supply function from an inter-temporal profit maximization problem 
of a bank (see Ishikawa (2005), Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000), and Elyasiani et al. (1995)). First, 
we define profit ktπ of the k -th bank operating in prefecture i in year t  as 
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d
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k
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k
tfl  are the loan interest rate, amount of loan 
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outstanding, call rate, amount of the call loan, deposit interest rate, amount of the deposit, and 
net increase in the loan ( kt
k
t
k
t llfl 1−−≡ ), respectively. Because a few banks compete within a 
prefecture, we assume an imperfect loan market so that the loan interest rate )( itit Lr  depends 
on the aggregate of loans in prefecture i, ∑
∈
≡
iprefecturek
k
tit lL . We also assume that the loan and 
deposit interest rates are common for banks in the same prefecture.6
),( kt
k
t fllC
 The call rate is the same 
across all prefectures. The operational cost function of a bank is , where we assume 
0>lC , 0≥llC , 0>flC , and 0, ≥flflC . Note that 0>flC  reflects a positive search cost 
to obtain new customers and a positive monitoring cost to mitigate asymmetric information 
between new customers and the bank. 
The k -th bank aims to maximize its firm value ktV  under the balance sheet constraint 
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 To simplify the model, we assume that ktd  and 
k
tcap  are exogenous.
7
t
 Further, Et is 
the operator of conditional expectation based on the information available in year , γ(0<γ<1) 
is the time discount rate. The first order condition becomes 
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6 Although inspection of the data of each bank reveals this assumption does not rigorously hold, the 
framework of prefectural segmented markets implies the existence of a market interest rate for each 
prefecture. 
7 In Japan, since the regulation on deposit interest rates was liberalized in 1993, the amount of 
deposits may be treated as a decision variable. Even in this case, however, the results of the 
following analysis are in essence not altered. 
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where 
it
it
it
it
it dr
dL
L
r
−≡η  is the loan supply elasticity to the loan interest rate in prefecture i, and 
it
k
t
kt L
lS ≡  is bank k’s market share in prefecture i.  
Taking a linear approximation of the cost function and solving equation (3) for ktl  yields  
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where we add land price ( itLP ), nonperforming loans (
k
tbad ), bank’s own capital (
k
tcap ), 
stock market price index ( tSP ), the dominance ratio of the number of branches of city banks to 
that of all types of banks (city, regional, and second regional banks) in prefecture i 
( itCITYBANKS ), and the population density ( itDENSITY ) to the explanatory variables. We 
assume that 0/)( ,,1 >+≡ δγα lflflfl CC , 0/)( ,,2 >+≡ δα lflflfl CC , 0/13 >≡ δα , 
,0,0,0,0 9654 >><> αααα  and 02)1( ,, >+++≡ lllflflfl CCC γδ .
8,9
Here, 
 
01 >α  captures a smoothing effect: When loans are expected to increase tomorrow, a 
bank will increase loans today to save operational costs. This type of formulation of 
forward-looking behavior is typical of Japanese banks, which has been empirically supported by 
Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000). In addition, 02 >α  captures an inertia effect: if loans increased 
yesterday, which can lower the monitoring costs today, a bank will increase loans today because 
                                                   
8 The population density is included in the operational cost function and, in turn, in the loan supply 
function, because it is less costly for bank staffs in higher density areas to visit their customers. 
9 If lflC ,  was a large negative value, δ  became negative, thus yielding a negative 3α . However, 
a negative sign on 3α  is not likely because it implies that a bank will increase its lending as the 
loan interest rate rises. Therefore, we postulate lflC ,  does not take a large negative value. 
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it can take advantage of the lowered costs.10 04 >α We expect  because a decrease in land 
price lowers the value of land held by a bank, leading to the impairment of capital and therefore 
a decrease in loans. A decrease in land price also lowers the collateral value of land, which may 
increase the screening costs of loan provisions, leading to a decrease in loans. We expect 05 <α  
and 06 >α  because an increase in nonperforming loans and a decrease in own capital will 
result in a rise in the probability of a bank’s default, leading to a reduction in the advancement 
of risky loans. However, 05 >α  is possible, which represents the case of forbearance lending 
(i.e., the advance of more loans by banks to troubled firms in order to postpone their 
bankruptcy) (Berglof and Roland (1995, 1997)). 
 The sign of α7 is not known a priori because a bank, faced with a blip in the stock 
market price index, may increase investment in stocks, consequently leading to a reduction of 
loans. Conversely, a rise in the index makes the value of owned stocks higher, consequently 
leading to an increase in capital, and therefore an increase in loans. The sign of 8α  is also not 
known: if bank k is as competitive as the city banks, it can increase its loans, but if it is not as 
competitive, it will be overwhelmed by the competition and decrease its loans. We expect 
9 0α >  because a bank faced with high population density can expand business easily and will 
increase its loans. 
 Loan supply function for prefecture i  in year t  is derived by aggregating equation 
(4). By denoting the number of banks in prefecture i  as I , we obtain 
 
0 1 1 2 1 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
[ ] ( )S cit t it it it t it it it
S S
t it it it i it
L E L L r r LP BAD CAP
SP CITYBANKS DENSITY HI
α α α α α α α
α α α α ν ε
+ −= + + + − + + +
+ + + + + +
,   (5) 
 
                                                   
10 Behavioral equations of forward-looking economic agents, which include both the lead and lag of 
the dependent variable, are often seen in recent macroeconomic literature, such as the hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips curve (Gali, Gertler, and Lopez (2005)). 
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where ∑
∈
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k
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S
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S
itε  
represents an i.i.d. disturbance term with 0][ =SitE ε . Following Kano and Tsutsui (2003), we 
assume that )(∑
∈ ∂
∂
iprefecturek
k
t
it
kt
it
it
l
LSr
η
 is associated with the Herfindahl index, ∑
∈
≡
iprefecturek
ktit SHI
2 . 
If the market structure-performance hypothesis is valid, then 010 <α . 
 
3.4  Specification of the loan demand function 
 We assume that loan demand increases as loan interest rates decline, sales increase, 
retained earnings decrease, population density increases, and the costs of alternative funds (e.g., 
bonds and equities) increase (Me’litz and Pardue (1973), Fase (1995), Ogawa and Suzuki 
(2000)). We also assume that land prices and the stock market price index can affect loan 
demand. An increase in land prices boosts the value of real estate owned by firms, lowers the 
probability that firms will default, and helps to increase investments, which may augment loan 
demand. There are two ways to look at the effects of the stock market price index on loan 
demand. Firms faced with a climb of the index may increase funds by issuing stocks, which 
would lead to a reduction of loan demand. On the other hand, a rise of the index can be viewed 
as better profitability in the future, which may increase loan demand. The dominance ratio of 
SMEs in prefecture i, (defined as the number of employees of firms that have 4 to 99 staff 
members in prefecture i / the number of employees of firms that have more than 4 staff 
members in prefecture i), can be an explanatory variable in the loan demand equation. Since the 
SMEs have difficulty in raising funds directly in the financial markets, they are more 
bank-dependent: the higher the dominance ratio of the SMEs, the stronger the bank loan 
demand. In addition, the number of housing starts may be an important explanatory variable in 
the loan demand equation, because people may borrow funds in order to buy houses. 
 12 
 When a firm or a household borrows funds from a new bank, they may incur 
additional search costs, as is the case with the loan supply. Thus, the loan demand also depends 
on its past and expected values. As the data of retained earnings by prefectures are not available, 
we specify the loan demand function as follows. 
 
0 1 1 2 1 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
[ ]Dit t it it it it it
b D D
it t t it it i it
L E L L r SALE HOUSE
LP SP r SME DENSITY
β β β β β β
β β β β β ν ε
+ −= + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
,           (6) 
 
where itSALE  is shipment of products, itHOUSE  is the number of housing starts, 
b
tr  is the 
interest rate of government bonds, itSME  is the dominance ratio of SMEs, 
D
iν  is an 
individual effect of prefecture i , and Ditε  represents an i.i.d. disturbance term with 
0][ =DitE ε . We expect that ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 9865432! >>>>><>> ββββββββ  and 
010 >β . The sign of 7β  is not known a priori. 
 
3.5  Data 
 We use annual data from 1990 to 2001 for each prefecture.11
k
 However, only the data 
for the following items are available for each prefecture: the amount of loans outstanding, 
dominance ratio of city banks, population density, shipment of products, number of housing 
starts, and dominance ratio of SMEs. Therefore, as for the data of loan interest rates, the amount 
of nonperforming loans, and the amount of bank capitals, we construct these data for each 
prefecture by aggregating the corresponding data of individual banks. Specifically, denoting the 
financial data of the -th bank as ktx —(1) for regional and second regional banks whose head 
offices are located in prefecture i  (referred to as group A), we just add up ktx  and (2) for city 
                                                   
11 Because the Japanese economy began to recover in January 2002, we chose the period up to 2001 
to analyze times when the reluctance to lend was supposed to be most severe, if it existed.  
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banks, trust banks, and long-term credit banks (referred to as group B), we multiply ktx  with 
kitw , a weight for prefecture i , and then add up the products.12
 Therefore, the data for prefecture 
 
i  in year t , tiX , , is  
 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
+=
iprefecturein
locatesofficehead
andgroupAk groupk
ktkitktit xwxX
B
 ,                     (7) 
 
where kitw  is defined as the number of employees of the k -th bank in year t  who work at 
branches located in prefecture i / the total number of employees of k -th bank in year t .13
 Data description is given in Table 1. It is interesting to note that in Table 1 the gaps 
between the minimums and the maximums are quite large except for the loan interest rate and 
the dominance ratio of SMEs. Indeed, the ratio maximum/minimum is 248 for loans, 39 for land 
price, 126,650 for nonperforming loans, 663 for own capital, 87 for population density, 74 for 
sales, and 39 for the number of housing starts. The necessity of utilizing the prefectural data 
stems from the fact that the economic variables are largely diversified among prefectures. The 
precise definitions of the data are given in Appendix. 
 
 
3.6  Estimation method 
 Assuming that the loan markets are in equilibrium, we estimate equations (5) and (6) 
simultaneously by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).14
                                                   
12 We omitted the Bank of Tokyo because it specialized primarily in international transactions. We 
also omitted the Shinsei and Aozora Banks because of data restrictions. 
 The endogenous variables 
are the loan interest rate and the amount of outstanding loans, and the instrumental variables are 
13 Since the information on the number of employees for each branch was made public only up until 
1998, the data for 1999–2001 were replaced by the values for 1998. 
14 We also estimated equations (5) and (6) by the two-stage least squares (2SLS). The results are 
almost the same as those by GMM; therefore, we skip reporting them. 
 14 
all the variables in equations (5) and (6) except for the endogenous variables.15
11][ ++ = ititt LLE
 As for the 
expected value of the loans, we assume perfect foresight, .16
 We control the fixed effects by subtracting the individual mean from the equations. We 
do not employ the random effects model because the distribution of the associated Hausman test 
statistics in this estimation is not yet well known to us.  
 
 
4.  Results 
4.1  Estimates of the supply and demand functions 
 We estimated equations (5) and (6) using the data of BAD  and CAP  in the current 
and former periods. Estimation with the data in the current period is problematic because 
SALE  is not significant and J-statistic is significant at the 10% level, which suggests 
misspecification of the model. Banks probably refer to BAD  and CAP  in relation to the 
previous period because they cannot obtain their current data by the time they make decisions 
on advancing loans. 
 The results using the data of BAD  and CAP  in the previous period are presented 
in the left column of Table 2. The results of the supply function are as expected: the lead and lag 
of the loan are significantly positive. Spread between the loan interest rate and the call rate, 
( SPR ) and land price (LP) are significantly positive, which was also to be expected. Likewise, 
bank’s own capital is significantly positive. However, the coefficient of nonperforming loans is 
                                                   
15 If we estimate a dynamic equation with panel data, it will also suffer from the endogeneity 
problem that lags of the dependent variable are not orthogonal to the error terms. In order to cope 
with this problem, one may take a difference of equations (5) and (6), and estimate them with 
instrumental variables chosen to be orthogonal to the error term (Arrelano and Bond (1991), 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981)). However, we have no other choice than to sacrifice econometric 
legitimacy because what we need to know is the magnitudes of the shifts of demand and supply 
curves and not the shifts of “differenced” demand and supply curves, which are hard to interpret. 
16 Some may argue that concomitant forecast errors will contaminate the consistency of the 
estimates. However, as is shown in the next subsection, the J-statistic is not significant at the 10% 
level, implying that the estimation may not be blurred by the endogeneity problem.  
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insignificant,17
 Looking at the results of the demand function, the lead and lag of the loan are 
significantly positive, loan interest rate is significantly negative, land price is significantly 
positive, sales are significantly positive, bond interest rate is significantly positive, the 
dominance ratio of SMEs is significantly positive, and population density is significantly 
positive; all of these take the expected signs. The number of housing starts is insignificant, 
suggesting that households borrowing to buy houses may not be a substantial part of the loans 
advanced by private banks. The stock market price index is significantly negative, implying that 
firms in the bearish equity market may decrease funds raised from stocks and may increase 
borrowing from banks instead. The J-statistic is not significant at the 10% level, supporting this 
specification.  
 which suggests that some banks must have advanced forbearance lending to 
some firms. The Herfindahl index is insignificant, indicating the market structure-performance 
hypothesis is not valid. The stock market price index is significantly negative, implying that 
banks in the bull equity market may reduce the amount of loans and may increase investments 
in stocks instead. The dominance ratio of city banks is insignificant, but the population density 
is significantly positive as was expected. 
 We estimate the functions deleting the insignificant variables, such as nonperforming 
loans, the Herfindahl index, the ratio of city banks, and the number of housing starts. The results 
are shown in the right column of Table 2. They are almost the same as those in the left column. 
In sum, these results are satisfactory, and the assumption of segmented prefectural loan markets 
fits the reality fairly well. 
 In the late 1990s, large banks went into bankruptcy. It is an interesting question 
whether the bank supply shrank owing to the bank failures. Thus, we ran regressions to measure 
the possible effects of the bank failures. Specifically, we constructed the bank failure dummies 
and estimated the same equation system shown in Table 2, incorporating the dummies to the 
                                                   
17 When we drop own capital, nonperforming loans becomes negative but remains insignificant at 
the 10% level. 
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supply function. Bank failure dummies are Hyogo in 1995, Hokkaido in 1997, Osaka in 1999, 
and Tokyo in 1999. We also checked the effect of the dummy variable defined as the sum of 
these dummies, which represents the average bank failures. However, in any case, these 
dummies do not show significant negative impact on the supply of loans (the results are not 
shown to save space). One possible reason for these results is that the other banks took over the 
loans of the failed banks. 
 
4.2  Has a reluctance to lend occurred? 
 Based on the estimates shown in the right column of Table 2, we calculate the shift of 
the supply and demand functions for each year from 1991 to 2001. First, the average of each 
explanatory variable across all prefectures in 1991 is substituted into the supply and demand 
functions, and these fitted values (fitA_supply, fitA_demand) are calculated. Then, the average 
of loan interest rates across all prefectures in 1991 and the averages of the other variables across 
all prefectures in 1992 are substituted into the supply and demand functions, and these fitted 
values (fitB_supply, fitB_demand) are calculated. The differences between these fitted values 
(fitB_supply－fitA_supply, fitB_demand－fitA_demand) are the magnitude of the supply and 
demand shifts from 1991 to 1992.  
 Figure 3, which presents the results of such calculations, reveals two facts. First, the 
actual value, the equilibrium value that equates loan demand and supply, the supply function, 
and the demand function all shifted toward the right (i.e., increasing direction) before 1996, 
while they shifted toward the left (decreasing direction) thereafter. Second, before 1996 the right 
(i.e., increasing) shifts of the supply function always exceeded those of the demand function, 
while after 1996 both shifts were roughly of the similar magnitude. 
 Let us first consider the period prior to 1996. The positive shifts of the actual and 
equilibrium values imply that the amount of outstanding loans increased every year. Figure 3 
indicates, however, that the increase in loans during this period was induced by an increase in 
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supply rather than an increase in demand, implying that the stagnant loan market was caused by 
the stagnant loan demand. Therefore, we conclude that the reluctance to lend did not occur in 
the earlier period. 
 In the period after 1996, the actual amount of loans decreased and the left shifts of the 
supply and demand functions are roughly of the same magnitude—implying that the decrease in 
loans depended on both supply and demand. When the results from the period after 1996 are 
compared with the results before 1996, it is clear that the reluctance to lend became more 
prevalent during the latter period.  
 In order to measure the magnitude of the reluctance to lend directly, let us calculate 
demand shift− supply shift, which we denote as tiRL , . The demand and supply functions are 
denoted as , 3 ,
D D
i t it i tL r Xβ β= +  and , 3 ,
S S
i t it i tL r Xα α= + , the corresponding demand and 
supply “shifts” can be written as ( ), , , 1D D Di t i t i tL X Xβ −∆ ≡ −  and ( ), , , 1S S Si t i t i tL X Xα −∆ ≡ −  
respectively, where DtiX ,  and 
S
tiX ,  stand for the exogenous explanatory variables in the 
demand and supply functions. Then, the reluctance to lend measure tiRL ,  is defined as 
, , , , 1 , , 1( ) ( )
D S D D S S
i t i t i t i t i t i tL L X X X Xβ α− −∆ −∆ = − − − .  
 A large and positive tiRL ,  means that the reluctance to lend is severer in prefecture i 
in year t. In addition, we calculate the factor decomposition tiFD ,  as 
, , , 1( )
D D
i t i t i tFD X Xβ −≡ −  for each explanatory variable in the demand function and 
, , , 1( )
S S
i t i t i tFD X Xα −≡ − − for that in the supply function in order to evaluate the cause of the 
reluctance to lend.18
 Figure 4, which shows the degree of reluctance to lend (demand shift
 
− supply shift) 
                                                   
18 If an exogenous variable Z is included both in the demand and supply functions, then the factor 
decomposition of this variable becomes , , , 1( )( )i t i t i tFD Z Zβ α −≡ − − . 
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and its factor decomposition, reveals three facts. First, the degree of reluctance to lend 
consistently increased from 1992 to 2000, implying that the reluctance to lend became severer 
in the late 1990s.19
 Let us take a closer look at the factor decomposition. In Table 3, we present the 
average factor decomposition across all prefectures during the periods 1992–1996 and 
1996–2000, in which the large and positive 
 Second, the reluctance to lend was greatly eased in 1995. Third, the call rate 
factor alone is almost enough to understand the severity of the reluctance to lend before 1996. 
However, other factors such as stock prices, bond rates, and bank capital became relatively 
important in the latter period. 
tiRL ,  means that the reluctance to lend is severer 
in prefecture i in year t. Among them, the call rate was the largest factor that alleviated the 
reluctance to lend. This result reflects the fact that the Bank of Japan lowered the call rate 
consecutively to ease money throughout the period. The effect, however, became weaker in the 
latter period because the call rate was lowered to near zero, so that there remained almost no 
room to fall further.20
 The other variables had a relatively small effect on the reluctance to lend. It is 
interesting to note, however, the results for the capital factor: the negative value of the factor 
decomposition for both periods indicates that bank capital was augmenting throughout the 
periods and helped to ease the reluctance to lend, although the contrary is often suggested by 
 The bond rate was the second largest factor that alleviated the reluctance 
to lend by suppressing the loan demand, in which the easing of the monetary policy also played 
a leading role. Another variable that had a large effect on easing the reluctance to lend was stock 
prices, which were declining throughout the period. This affected the reluctance to lend because 
the decrease in stock prices boosted both the supply of and the demand for loans; since the boost 
to the supply was stronger, it helped to alleviate the reluctance to lend. 
                                                   
19 One may alternatively argue that the reluctance to lend was not the case at all before 1996, except 
for 1994, but it might have been thereafter. 
20 The Bank of Japan began to adopt a zero-interest-rate policy in February, 1999 and effectively 
lifted it in July, 2006.  
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previous studies. The results indicate that the difference between the two periods is significantly 
positive, which implies that the augmentation of bank capital contributed to easing the 
reluctance to lend more in the latter period than in the former.  
 
4.3  The reluctance to lend was severer in populous and urban prefectures  
 In order to allow the comparisons of the degree of reluctance to lend among 
prefectures, we calculate the rate of shift tiRRL , , dividing tiRL ,  by the equilibrium value of 
the loan (the demand-and-supply balancing loan amount) from the previous year. RRLit is then 
averaged over 1992 to 1996, and 1996 to 2000.  
 We present the rate of reluctance to lend, RRL, for each prefecture in Figure 5 
(1992–1996) and in Figure 6 (1996–2000), which reveal the following four facts. First, the RRL 
is negative in every prefecture, suggesting that an expansion in supply (a reduction in demand) 
outweighed an expansion in demand (a reduction in supply) in 1992–1996 (in 1996–2000) in 
every prefecture. Second, when we compare the two periods, the RRL is larger (smaller in 
negative value) in 1996–2000 than in 1992–1996 for most of the prefectures, which is consistent 
with our intuition that the reluctance to lend was severer in the latter period. Third, the 
prefectures in the top five RRLs are Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Fukuoka in either 
period, all of which have megacities. Meanwhile, the prefectures in the bottom five RRLs are 
Iwate, Tottori, Shimane, Kochi, and Miyazaki in the former period (Akita, Yamanashi, Tottori, 
Shimane, and Kochi in the latter period), all of which do not have large cities and are 
characterized as rural regions. In a word, the reluctance to lend was severer in populated areas.21
 In order to confirm the third fact, we selected the five largest and five smallest RRL 
 
Fourth, most of the prefectures with larger (smaller in negative value) RRLs in the earlier period 
also have larger (smaller in negative value) RRLs in the latter period. Indeed, the correlation 
between the RRLs in both periods is quite high with a correlation coefficient of 0.989.  
                                                   
21 Actual outstanding loans also decreased in the populated prefectures like Tokyo, Aichi and Osaka. 
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prefectures and examined their characteristics. In Table 4, we present the mean of the population, 
population density, GDP, per capita GDP, sales, per capita sales, the dominance ratio of the 
number of branches of city banks to that of all types of banks, and the SME ratio for the top five 
and bottom five prefectures in 1992–1996 and in 1996–2000.  
 In 1992–1996 (the upper panel of Table 4), the mean of the population for the top five 
prefectures is 8.09×106 and for the bottom five prefectures it is 9.59×105. This is shown by the 
mean difference test in the rightmost column; the former is significantly larger than the latter. 
Similarly, the means of population density, GDP, per capita GDP, sales, per capita sales, and the 
dominance ratio of city banks for the top five prefectures are significantly larger than those for 
the bottom five prefectures. The mean of the dominance ratio of SMEs, SME, is significantly 
smaller for the top five prefectures than that for the bottom five prefectures. In sum, the top five 
prefectures are characterized by larger population, GDP, sales, and city bank branches; therefore, 
we will refer to them as “populous prefectures” from this point on.22
 
 
4.4  Why were populous prefectures hit by a reluctance to lend? 
 In the previous subsection, we found that the reluctance to lend was severer in the 
prefectures that have megacities than in others. In order to elucidate the possible causes, we 
calculate the factor decompositions for the top five prefectures and for the bottom five, which 
are presented in Table 5.23
 Let us take a look at the results of the mean difference in the table. Changes in bank 
capital and the dominance ratio of SMEs were the principal causes of the intensified reluctance 
 To highlight the characteristics of the two groups, we test the 
difference of the mean of the factor decomposition, which are shown in the right hand columns 
of the table. 
                                                   
22 We also examined whether populous and urban prefectures tend to decrease the actual amount of 
loans. The results are just the same as those of RRLs.  
23 Here, we present only the results of the factor decompositions for the prefecture-specific variables, 
because those for the other variables, such as the call rate, are identical to every prefecture, so that 
their factor decompositions will also be identical. 
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to lend in populous prefectures throughout both periods. Population density similarly affected 
the intensified reluctance to lend, but its effect became much smaller. The value of capital 
factors is significantly positive in the earlier period, which indicates that bank capital was an 
important element that intensified the reluctance to lend in populous prefectures in comparison 
with the bottom five prefectures. In the later period, the mean difference is still positive and 
large, though not significant.24
 In the earlier period, SME factors, although not significant, were also important. 
However, in the later period, SME factors did become significant and were, in fact, the largest 
contributing element that intensified the reluctance to lend in populous prefectures in 
comparison with the bottom five prefectures, while capital factors were the second largest.
 
25
 In sum, variations in the intensity of the reluctance to lend among prefectures came 
from discrepancies in the health of the local economies, which is represented by the capital of 
banks as well as by the SME ratio, which are indicators of profitability among firms in the 
prefecture.  
  
 
5.  Conclusions  
 In this paper, we analyzed whether the supply side played a crucial role in causing 
stagnant and declining outstanding loans in Japan in the 1990s, with a special focus on its 
spatial differences. In other words, this paper attempted to clarify whether a reluctance to lend 
                                                   
24 The bank capital factor for the top five prefectures had a positive sign in the earlier period, 
implying that loans had decreased in populous prefectures (the first column in the upper panel). In 
the latter period, however, the bank capital factor of populous prefectures became negative, which 
means that loans had increased. This may be because bank capital in the populous prefectures was 
augmented possibly due to the injection of public funds. The same is true for the bottom five 
prefectures, and the mean difference was positive, which implies that bank capital in the bottom five 
prefectures experienced greater augmentation than the populous prefectures during the latter period. 
25 A larger SME ratio expanded loan demand (see Table 2), leading to a deterioration of the 
reluctance to lend. The bottom panel of Table 5 reveals that in the latter period, SME factors took on 
a large negative value for the bottom five prefectures. Comparison with the corresponding value in 
the earlier period (upper panel) indicates that loans for SMEs had sharply increased for the bottom 
five prefectures during the latter period. This is the reason why the SME ratio became an important 
element in the latter period. 
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actually occurred in the Japanese loan market. To this end, we calculate the magnitude of the 
shift of the supply and demand functions, provided that the loan market was in equilibrium. If 
the supply function shifted towards the left more than the demand function did, borrowers 
would have faced a strict attitude from the banks regarding the advancement of loans, which is 
in effect a reluctance to lend. Under the assumption that the Japanese loan markets are 
segmented by prefecture, we estimated the supply and demand functions using prefectural panel 
data from 1990 to 2001. This paper is unique in that it estimates both equations simultaneously 
and evaluates the severity of the reluctance to lend by comparing the magnitudes of the supply 
and demand shifts. 
 The estimation results reveal that until 1996, the supply function shifted toward the 
right more than the demand function did, indicating that stagnant loans in this period cannot be 
explained by the supply side. However, after 1996, when the loan amount decreased, the loan 
supply shifted leftward as much as the loan demand, implying that the contraction of supply 
contributed partly to the decrease in loans. 
 Closer examination revealed the salient characteristics of those prefectures that 
suffered from a severer reluctance to lend. First, the degree of the reluctance to lend was severer 
in the urban and populous prefectures. Second, the call rate and bond rate, which were declining 
because of a monetary easing policy, played a leading role in alleviating the reluctance to lend 
throughout the period. 
 These results suggest the following lessons. First, it is important to evaluate how much 
banks contribute to the reduction of loans—the role of the supply side is often overemphasized, 
as was the case in Japan. Our analysis reveals that the demand side played an equal or greater 
role, even in the context of the historical financial crisis in Japan during the period 1997–2000. 
If the reduction is mainly due to the lack of demand, countermeasures in the banking sector may 
not achieve the expected recovery. For example, according to an exercise conducted in 1998 and 
1999 to evaluate the effect of the injection of public funds on bank lending, the injection 
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increased outstanding loans by only a couple of percentage points among the actual decrease of 
−142.31 and −173.53 billion yen respectively.26
 As shown in Figure 1, bank loans in the US are in sharp decline and have been since 
April 2008. Whether this decline is brought about from the supply or demand side, however, is 
not known a priori. Although the supply side did not play an important role in the Heisei 
Depression in Japan, as discussed in this paper, mechanisms of the crises differ between Japan 
and the US. In the case of Japan, the stock bubble burst first in 1990, the real estate bubble burst 
in 1991, then the GDP growth rate started to decline in 1992, and finally, financial crisis 
(bankruptcy of financial institutions) started in 1997-98. On the other hand, the order of 
occurrence differed for the US: the real estate bubble burst, the default of financial derivatives 
occurred, financial crisis (bankruptcy of financial institutions) started, and then the GDP growth 
rate declined. This fact suggests that the collapse of the financial system in the US preceded the 
depression, which is contrary to what happened in Japan. Therefore, the supply side of loans 
should play a more important role in the US than in Japan; however, since the corporate profits 
started to decline already in 2006, it might be that the opposite is true. In order to obtain a 
definitive answer, we will need to estimate the magnitudes of the shifts of demand and supply 
functions in the case of the US.       
 Second, we demonstrate that the degree of the 
reluctance to lend was not uniform in Japan, but differed markedly among regions. This 
suggests that measures such as traditional monetary policy that influenced all regions uniformly 
were inadequate. Region-specific policies are therefore called for. 
                                                   
26 The effect of the injection should be smaller than these estimates, if we consider the effect of 
financing the injection fund from a tax increase. Ishikawa (2004) simulated his general equilibrium 
model and found that the injection resulted in a decrease rather than an increase in the short run. 
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Appendix: Precise definitions of the data 
 
Bank Loans Outstanding: “Deposits, Loans and Discounts Outstanding of Domestically 
Licensed Banks by Prefecture (at the end of the fiscal year),” Source: Economic Statistics 
by Prefecture, Bank of Japan.  
Land Prices: “Land Price of Residential District (average, unit is 100 yen/m2),” Source: Land 
Price Survey by Prefecture, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.  
Call Rates: “Unsecured Overnight Call Rate (monthly average balance),” Source: Financial and 
Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan. 
Shipment of Products: “Statistics by Prefecture, Shipment of Products (employees over 4 people, 
all manufacturing industries, and calendar year),” Source: Industrial Statistics 
(Manufacturing Industry), Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry.  
Housing Starts: “The Number of Housing Starts, Classified by Funds and Purposes (houses 
funded by private sector, owned house),” Source: Statistical Report on Execution of 
Construction Work, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.  
Bond Rates: “Subscriber’s Yield of 10-year Government Bond (annual average),” Source: Home 
Page of Bank of Japan. 
Stock market price index: “Nikkei Average of 225 Selected Issues in the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(at the end of the fiscal year, monthly average), Source: Home Page of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. 
The number of branches of city banks, regional banks, second regional banks: “The number of 
branches of city banks, regional banks, second regional banks,” Source: Financial Journal 
Monthly, Extra Edition (in Japanese, Gekkan Kin-yu Journal, Zoukan Gou), The Japan 
Financial News Co., Ltd. 
Dominance ratio of city banks of prefecture i at t-th year is calculated as “(the number of 
branches of city banks of prefecture i at t-th year) / (the number of branches of city banks, 
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regional banks, and second regional banks of prefecture i at t-th year).” 
Population: “Population by Prefectures, with intercensal adjustment (as of October 1 of each 
year),” Source: Population Census, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Area of prefecture: “Area by Prefectures (as of October 1 of each year, in square kilometers),” 
Source: Area Survey, Geographical Survey Institute, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport. 
Population Density of prefecture i at t-th year is calculated as “(population of prefecture i at t-th 
year) / (area of prefecture i at t-th year in square kilometers).” 
The number of employees of small and medium sized firms: “Number of employees, Statistics 
Tables by Prefecture (establishments with 4 or more employees),” Source: Industrial 
Statistics (Manufacturing Industry), Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry. 
Dominance ratio of small and medium sized firms of prefecture i at t-th year is calculated as 
“(the total number of employees of the firms of 4 to 99 staffs in the prefecture i at t-th 
year) / (the total number of employees of the firms of more than 4 staffs in the prefecture i 
at t-th year).” 
Nonperforming loans: “Allowances for Loan Losses,” Source: Nikkei Needs Bank data. 
Own capital: “the sum of capital stock, payment for new shares, capital reserve, earned surplus 
reserve, voluntary reserve, and unappropriated profit,” Source: Nikkei Needs Bank data.  
Loan interest rate of prefecture i at t-th year is calculated as “(loan interest revenue of 
prefecture i at t-th year)/ (amount of outstanding loan of prefecture i at the end of t-1-th 
year),” Source: Nikkei Needs Bank data. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
     
(variables) average standard deviation minimum maximum 
L 9.91×103 2.90×104 8.38×102 2.09×105 
SPR 2.09 0.920 −1.68 3.80 
RL 4.02 1.89 1.65 8.56 
RC 1.93 2.53 2.00×10-3 8.28 
RB 3.24 1.80 0.972 6.80 
LP 8.68 9.42 2.23 8.59 
SP 1.80×104 3.79×103 1.15×104 2.65×104 
CITYBANKS 0.0958 0.159 0.00435 0.736 
DENSITY 6.52×102 1.12×103 67.7 5.90×103 
HI 0.405 0.172 0.0747 0.802 
BAD 78.6 3.04×102 0.323 4.09×103 
CAP 6.45×102 1.70×103 19.8 1.31×104 
SALE 6.61×103 7.11×103 5.27×102 3.88×104 
HOUSE 4.66×103 4.56×103 7.15×102 2.80×104 
SME 0.559 0.0789 0.356 0.778 
 
Notes：L is amount of outstanding loans (in billion yen). SPR is spread 
between the loan interest rate and the call rate (in percent). RL is the loan 
interest rate (in percent). RC is the call rate (in percent). RB is the bond 
interest rate (subscriber’s yield of 10-year government bond, in percent). 
LP is the land price (per unit square meter, in ten thousand yen). SP is the 
stock market price index (in yen). CITYBANKS is the dominance ratio of 
city banks. DENSITY is the population density (persons in square 
kilometers). HI is the Herfindahl index. BAD is the amount of 
nonperforming loans (in billion yen). CAP is the amount of own capital (in 
billion yen). SALE is the amount of sales (in billion yen). HOUSE is the 
number of housing starts. SME is the dominance ratio of SMEs. The 
sample period is from 1990 to 2001, and the number of prefectures is 47. 
The number of observations is 564. 
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Notes: See notes to Table 1 for definition of the variables. The dependent variable is the amount of 
outstanding loans. L(+1) and L(−1) denote a one-year lead and lag of the amount of outstanding 
loans. BAD(−1) and CAP(−1) denote a one-year lag of the amount of nonperforming loans and own 
capital. The loan demand and supply equations are estimated simultaneously by the GMM, in which 
we control fixed effects by subtracting individual mean from the equations. Endogenous variables 
are the amount of outstanding loans and loan interest rate. Instrumental variables are all of the 
variables in the loan demand and supply equations except for the endogenous variables. The 
numbers in parentheses ( ) are t-ratios. The superscripts ***, **, and * mean that the variables are 
significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. J-Statistics tests the null hypothesis that 
over-identified restriction is satisfied in the GMM estimation. p-values are shown in brackets [ ]. The 
sample period is from 1991 to 2000, and the number of prefectures is 47. The number of 
observations is 470.
Table 2.  Estimation Results of the loan supply and demand functions (GMM)  
L(+1) + 0.488***  (15.1) 0.489***  (13.6) 
L(−1) + 0.476***   (11.6) 0.481***  (11.1) 
SPR + 4.96×102**  (2.52) 4.27×102** (2.36) 
LP + 2.07**   (2.33) 1.84**  (2.00) 
BAD(−1) − 0.0109   (0.871)  
CAP(−1) + 0.0520***  (4.27) 0.0400*** (3.46) 
HI − 3.76×102  (0.771)  
SP ? −0.102***  (−3.75) −0.0895*** (−3.10) 
CITY BANKS ? 9.72×102  (1.28)  
DENSITY + 22.1**  (2.01) 20.5*  (1.73) 
L(+1) + 0.486***  (14.6) 0.488***  (13.4) 
L(−1) + 0.475***  (11.3) 0.480***  (10.9) 
RL − −1.50×102*** (−2.72) –1.36×102** (−2.50) 
LP + 2.08**   (2.30) 1.88** (2.02) 
SALE + 5.60×10-3** (2.24) 5.53×10-3** (2.34) 
HOUSE + −2.86×10-3 (−0.331)  
SP ? −0.0683***  (−2.594) −0.0613**  (−2.19) 
RB + 57.0**  (2.31) 56.0**   (2.30) 
SME + 2.95×103* (1.72) 2.42×103 (1.56) 
DENSITY + 22.2** (1.97) 21.1* (1.72) 
    
J-Statistics  8.04 6.43 
  [0.430] [0.377] 
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Table 3.  Factor decompositions of the reluctance to lend measure (average of all prefectures) 
variables 
average of all prefectures 
1992–1996 1996–2000 mean difference (Welch) test 
(a) mean s.d. (b) mean s.d. (a) - (b) T d.f. 
reluctance to lend  
measure RLit −1.537
*** 1.910 −0.255*** 0.480 −1.282*** −10.00 264 
call rate factors −1.372*** 1.790 −0.081*** 0.241 −1.292*** −10.96 242 
land price factors −1.64×10－3 *** 6.12×10－3 −1.14×10－3 *** 2.32×10－3 −5.00×10－4 −1.18 300 
sales factors −5.05×10－3 *** 0.026 2.16×10－3 0.028 −7.21×10－3*** −2.89 465 
capital factors −2.33×10－3 *** 0.015 −7.49×10－3 *** 0.036 5.17×10－3** 2.01 317 
stock price factors −0.039*** 0.294 −0.122*** 0.344 0.083*** 2.81 457 
bond rate factors −0.106*** 0.211 −0.039*** 0.120 −0.067*** −4.26 370 
SME factors −0.012*** 0.066 −0.020*** 0.077 8.37×10－3 1.27 457 
population density  
factors 1.17×10
－3 *** 1.93×10－3 3.80×10－4*** 1.80×10－3 7.86×10－4*** 4.57 466 
 
Notes: The reluctance to lend measure RLit is defined as “demand shift－supply shift,” or RLit = 
β (XDit－XDit-1 )－α (XSit－XSit-1), where XDit and XSit are the exogenous explanatory variables in the 
demand and supply functions, α  
and β  
are the corresponding coefficients. Large and positive 
RLit means that the reluctance to lend is severer in prefecture i in year t. The factor decompositions 
of the reluctance to lend measure, for example, correspond to β (XDit－XDit-1 ) or α (XSit－XSit-1). 
The null hypothesis of the mean difference (Welch) test is that the mean difference (a)-(b) is zero. 
The statistics T is defined as 
BBAABA nsns
22)( +− µµ , where Aµ  and Bµ  are the sample 
means of group A and B, sA and sB are the sample standard deviations, nA and nB are the number of 
observations, respectively. Under the null, the statistics T follows t-distribution with degrees of 
freedom d.f. Also refer to the notes for Table 2. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of prefectures whose reluctance to lend measures are top five and 
bottom five  
 [1992–1996]           
variables 
  top 5 prefectures   bottom 5 prefectures   mean difference (Welch) test 
  (a) mean s.d.   (b) mean s.d.   (a) － (b) T d.f. 
Reluctance to lend  
measures RRLit   −0.164
*** 0.224   −3.41 3.13   3.25 *** 5.18 24 
population  8.09×106*** 2.35×106  9.59×105*** 2.98×105  7.13×106 *** 15.06 25  
population density  3.24×103*** 1.87×103  1.36×102*** 33.99  3.10×103 *** 8.27 24  
GDP  3.99×105*** 2.20×105  2.88×104*** 8.84×103  3.70×105 *** 8.42 24  
per capita GDP  0.046*** 0.012  0.030*** 2.07×10-3  0.016 *** 6.67 25  
Sales  2.27×105*** 9.34×104  1.27×104*** 5.27×103  2.14×105 *** 11.43 24  
per capita sales  0.029*** 0.014  0.013*** 3.36×10-3  0.016 *** 5.52 27  
city banks  0.100*** 0.064  1.49×10-3*** 4.59×10-4  0.098 *** 7.65 24  
SME   0.519*** 0.102   0.621*** 0.075   −0.102 *** −4.03 44  
           
  [1996–2000]               
variables   top 5 prefectures   bottom 5 prefectures   mean difference (Welch) test 
  (a) mean s.d.   (b) mean s.d.   (a) – (b) T d.f. 
Reluctance to lend 
measures RRLit   −0.020 0.059   −0.578 0.858   0.558 
*** 3.24 24  
population  8.17×106*** 2.30×106  8.58×105*** 1.99×105  3.71×106 *** 15.83 24  
population density  3.26×103*** 1.86×103  1.46×102*** 41.34  3.12×103 *** 8.35 24  
GDP  4.14×105*** 2.30×105  2.84×104*** 6.51×103  3.85×105 *** 8.38 24  
per capita GDP  0.048*** 0.013  0.033*** 2.06×10-3  0.014 *** 5.49 25  
sales  2.11×105*** 8.82×104  1.41×104*** 6.35×103  1.97×105 *** 11.15 24  
per capita sales  0.027*** 0.013  0.017*** 6.80×10-3  0.010 *** 3.46 36  
city banks  0.096*** 0.061  2.27×10-3*** 1.87×10-3  0.094 *** 7.71 24  
SMEs   0.523*** 0.100   0.622*** 0.073   −0.093 *** −4.00 44  
 
Notes: The reluctance to lend measure RRLit is defined as RLit divided the equilibrium value of the 
loan (demand-and-supply balancing loan amount) in the previous year. Also refer to the notes for 
Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 5.  Factor decompositions of the reluctance to lend measures  
(top five and bottom five prefectures) 
 
  [1992–1996]                 
variables 
  top 5 prefectures   bottom 5 prefectures   mean difference (Welch) test 
  (a) mean s.d.   (b) mean s.d.   (a) – (b) T d.f. 
reluctance to lend  
measures RRLit   −0.164
*** 0.224   −3.41*** 3.13   3.25 *** 5.18 24  
land price factors  −1.97×10-3*** 1.99×10-3  1.40×10-3*** 2.55×10-3  −3.37×10-3 *** −5.20 45  
sales factors  −9.71×10-3*** 0.021  3.05×10-3 0.014  −0.013 *** −2.52 41  
Capital factors  6.05×10-3 0.017  −8.52×10-3*** 0.016  0.015 *** 3.07 48  
SME factors  −9.08×10-4 4.71×10-3  −0.020 0.124  0.019 0.78 24  
population density  
factors   1.47×10
-3*** 1.58×10-3   −1.83×10-4 9.41×10-4   1.65×10-3 *** 4.49 39  
             
  [1996–2000]                 
variables 
  top 5 prefectures   bottom 5 prefectures   mean difference (Welch) test 
  (a) mean s.d.   (b) mean s.d.   (a) – (b) T d.f. 
reluctance to lend  
measures RRLit   −0.020 0.059   −0.578
*** 0.858   0.558 *** 3.24 24  
land price factors  −7.37×10-4*** 5.84×10-4  −6.35×10-4 3.02×10-3  −1.02×10-4 −0.17 26  
sales factors  −3.00×10-3 0.022  5.81×10-3 0.027  −8.81×10-3 −1.27 46  
Capital factors  −4.04×10-3 0.044  −1.47×10-2*** 0.024  0.011 1.07 37  
SME factors  1.63×10-3 6.97×10-3  −0.062* 0.149  0.064 ** 2.15 24  
population density  
factors   1.50×10
-3*** 1.51×10-3   −4.09×10-4 1.33×10-3   1.91×10-3 *** 4.73 47  
 
Notes: Refer to the notes for Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
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Figure 1. Recent decline in the amount of loans in the United States due to the subprime loan problem 
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Notes: The data source is the website of The Federal Reserve Board. 
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Figure 2. Bank credit in Japan and the United States 
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Notes: The data source of bank credit in Japan is from the Financial Statistics Annual, the Bank of Japan. The sample period is from 1944 to 2004. The data 
source of bank credit in the US is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The sample period is from 1973 to 2003. 
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Figure 3. Shifts in the loan supply and demand functions 
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Notes: The shift due to supply and demand side for year t is calculated as follows: first, we substitute the prefectural average of each explanatory variable in 
year t-1 and calculate the fitted value of supply of and demand for loans in year t-1. Then, substituting the mean of loan interest rate in year t-1 and the 
mean of the other variables in year t, we calculate the fitted value in year t. The difference between these fitted values is the magnitude of the shifts from 
year t-1 to t. The equilibrium shift for year t is the difference between the prefectural average of equilibrium loans (supply-demand balancing loans) in year 
t and that in year t-1. The actual shift for year t is the difference between the prefectural average of outstanding loans in year t and that in year t-1. 
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Figure 4. The degree of reluctance to lend and its factor decompostion 
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Notes: Refer to the notes for Table 3. 
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Figure 5. The degree of reluctance to lend and its factor decompostion (by prefecture; 92–96) 
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Notes: Refer to the notes for Tables 3 and 4. 
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Figure 6. The degree of credit cruch and its factor decompostion (by prefecture; 96–00) 
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Notes: Refer to the notes for Tables 3 and 4. 
 
